Using a standard complete specialization model of a small open economy within a rigorous intertemporal optimization framework with contractbased wage rigidity, we show that permanent tariffs may lead to a current account deterioration and a fall in employment, contradicting most of the literature of macro-economic effects of import tariffs. I show that this will always be the case if the economy is small enough. The crucial factor in this complete reversal of standard results is the impact of tariffs on domestic real product wages via wage indexation. Temporary tariffs will have less of a negative impact on the CA or potentially even a positive impact, because they increase the consumption rate of interest (the ternis at which future consumption can be traded for current consumption) and so increase private savings.
Introduction
The continued persistence of the post 1973 slowdown in world-wide economic growth has led to increasing pressure in many countries to maintain growth while preserving external balance by using commercial policy to protect domestic production. Much of the existing literature on macro-economic effects of tariffs seems to lend support to that approach (at least under a fixed exchange rate regime). For a recent exposition, see Dornbusch (1980) or Chalciolades (1978) who provide further references going all the way back to Metzler (1949) . See furthermore, Johnson (1958) , Mussa (1974a) or Boyer (1977) . The argument is straightforward: higher tariffs (with revenues rebated to consumers) have a pure substitution effect leading to a higher demand for domestic goods which in turn leads to higher output, income and therefore savings. Higher savings imply a current account improvement. Under flexible exchange rates an appreciating currency may offset these effects (see Mundell (1961) and Boyer (1977) ).
I will argue that implausible assumptions on wage behavior are crucial to those results. Output will only go up if the increase in tariffs succeeds in lowering the real product wage. Since the macro-economic literature on tariffs usually assumed fixed nominal wages when discussing employment effects, the results follow automatically if the tariff increase succeeds in shifting domestic demand towards our goods.
One problem with all this has to do with foreign retaliation.
Another problem arises because of the issue of real wage resistance. Often real wage indexation is at the root of internal/external balance conflicts.
It is not clear why commercial policy would succeed in lowering the real wage where other attempts have failed. It then becomes of interest to explore the SV-039/SVD/04-17-87 2 consequences of commercial policy when wage indexation is effective. I will focus on tariffs in this paper.
A further problem with the macroeconomic literature on tariff policy is that its conclusions on CA effects are based on models incorporating arbitrary static savings functions, not a very meaningful procedure in an analysis of a clearly intertemporal issue such as current account behavior.
An elegant exception is the note by Razin and Svensson (1983) who however assume market clearing real wages and, in another departure from the standard Mundell framework, exogenous terms of trade.
In what follows we will stick to the Mundell framework but introduce contract based real wage rigidity and savings behavior derived from explicit forward looking maximizing behavior. Section 2 derives the main results of this paper in a two-period framework (the minimum needed to get a time structure in). We assume contract-based real (consumption) wage rigidity in response to unanticipated shocks. No second period shocks unanticipated at the beginning of period two will be considered, so that period will be characterized by full employment. In Section 3, I briefly discuss to what extent the results depend on the special assumptions made. In particular, introduction of aggregate investment and extension to incomplete specialization are discussed. Section 4 discusses the possibility of using some or all of the tariff revenues for wage subsidies to get around the wage rigidity problem. Section 5 concludes.
2.
Tariffs, Employment and the Current Account
The Model
Consider a two country Mundell-Fleming framework where each country produces only one good. We make two alternative assumptions about output: in the No Wage Indexation (NWI) case, output is always at its full employment level; in the Wage Indexation (WI) case, unemployment may result if wage indexation prevents real product wages to fall to their market clearing level.
We assume utility 11 to be weakly homothetically separable in consumption today and consumption tomorrow while the period by period subutility indices are homothetic and identical in terms of functional form and parameter values (the arguments may of course differ across periods).
This allows us to define unit utility expenditure functions and 112 which can be interpreted as aggregate price indices, and an expenditure function:
(1) E = E(111,II2,U) * where iS=1/(1+r ), one over one plus the world interest rate. By choice of normalization foreign prices are set equal to one. p indicates the relative price of domestic goods in terms of foreign goods in period i (the terms of trade). Under the assumptions made so far, 11. = 1I.(p.,l) with 311.13p. = C/Z. with C. consumption of domestic goods by domestic residents in period i and real consumption expenditure in period i. By property of expenditure functions, Z = 3E/aII. so that C. = aE/p.
Wage indexation is introduced in a simple manner: wage contracts are negotiated at the beginning of each period, incorporating all information available at that time. They are set at a level that will lead to full employment if no unanticipated shocks occur during the contract period, and are indexed on the CPI (iIi). Since we will not consider any shocks or policy changes in the second period that are unanticipated at the beginning of that SV-039/SVD/04-17-87 4 second period, full employment will obtain in that period. Accordingly the goods market clearing equation for period 2 is:
with X2 being the full employment output level. Of course first period disequilibrium will influence the second period goods market equilibrium via the intertemporal budget constraint.
In the first period, CPI indexation yields:
We will for simplicity set the initial tariff at zero. This is, however, of no consequence for any of the results. The period one wage equation can be rearranged to give an expression for the real product wage in terms of domestic goods: dp dp The goods market equilibrium condition for period 1 then becomes:
The budget constraint facing domestic residents is: We will make one important simplifying assumption: we will assume that the relative price of foreign goods tomorrow in terms of foreign goods today (6) , is fixed, allowing Hicks-aggregation of current and future foreign goods. The market clearing equation for that Hicks-aggregate good is redundant because of Walras' law. A true two-country model would of course endogenize 6 (or, equivalently, the world rate of interest), leading to two separate market clearing equations for foreign goods, one for period one and the other for period two, only one of which would be redundant. The benefits of extra generality that endogenizing 6 would yield do not seem to justify the additional complexity it would also lead to, at least for the particular issue we are looking at now (Appendix B does, however, provide an outline of such a generalization).
Results
One result is immediate: if the Metzler paradox does not obtain, higher tariffs will lead to real wage pressure in the domestic goods sector.
Equation (3) says that nominal wage changes equal a weighted average of tariff changes and domestic price changes; ruling out the Metzler paradox implies df1 dp1 that > -so the real (domestic) product wage goes up, and employment 1 p1 SV-039/SVD/04-17-87 7 and firstperiod output go down after an increase in the tariff rate (equations (3 & 4) ). Tariff increases would lower the real wage "ex ante"; real wage indexation will, to prevent that, lead to an increase in the real domestic product wage and therefore to unemployment (qualifications to that result due to relaxing the Mundell-Fleming complete specialization assumption are discussed in the next section).
Differentiation of equation (6) around the zero tariff equilibrium indicates that:
Similarly for foreign welfare: * *_l * * dUE (-E dp-E &dp)
If this is substituted into (1), simple algebra gives expressions for the terms of trade effects dp1 caused by changes in tariffs. We distinguish the case with wage indexation (WI), and the case without (NWI); in the latter, all terms involving X1 drop Out. For the first period, terms of trade changes induced by tariffs today and tariffs in the second period are: CiE = Epu/Eu, the marginal propensity to spend on domestic goods in period i. We will make the usual assumption that own substitution effects dominate income effects (x11+ E12< 0).
The particular structure of the utility function guarantees that cross-terms such as E £ etc. are all l 1 positive.
A is the Jacobian of (1) after substituting in (6a) and is positive in stable configurations. The explicit expression for A is given in dp2 dp2
Appendix A.1 Similar expressions can be derived for -and ---
The results are fairly straightforward, higher tariffs today (df1 > 0) and higher tariffs tomorrow (df2 > 0) will both put upward pressure on today's terms of trade. The Metzler paradox corresponds to dp1/df1 > 1, a possibility that cannot be excluded, although we will assume that foreign demand elasticities are high enough to rule it out.
Including wage indexation leads to similar expressions (see Appendix 
, and (8a, b) immediately shows that: dp dp
This expression is positive if A1 < A, which will be the case if the Metzler paradox does not obtain (dp1/df1 < 1). This is intuitive: with wage indexation, aggregate supply of first period home goods falls, hence a larger relative price increase is necessary to restore goods market equilibrium.
Since we have ignored investment so far, current account effects of tariffs can be derived by looking at private savings. To avoid uninteresting ambiguities, we will make a symmetry assumption on flow variables across Due to the utility structure assumed, real expenditure in any given period is a function of welfare U and the consumption discount factor p = (the inverse of one plus the consumption rate of interest):
The current account 1/ in period 1 then becomes
Consider first the effects of a temporary tariff in period 1:
1/ Since there is no initial debt, there are no first period interest payments, so the trade balance and the CA are identical in period 1.
Induced income effects in period 1 lead to a CA improvement because part of the gains will be spent tomorrow (the term above (A) If there is no wage indexation (NWI), (A) will thus dominate 1 1 (B) if foreign goods today (against which the tariff is levied) are a closer substitute for domestic goods today than they are for domestic gods tomorrow, a reasonable assumption which we will make: 1+f1 dp dp (14) ___ dp _, (..
where is the expenditure share of domestic goods and 4F of foreign goods. (14) indicates that high but temporary tariffs (only in period 1) will decrease the discount factor (increase the consumption rate of interest). This is because they lead to a real appreciation in period 1 that will be partially reversed later on (i.e. an anticipated depreciation over time after the initial unanticipated appreciation). 2/ So temporary tariff increases in period 1 will lead to a current account improvement both because of the 1/ CIE = E u/Eu , the marginal propensity to spend in period 1. Under the symmetry assumptions made, CIE/CIE T1/T2 where is the number of years in period i. Similarly, E1JE2 = T1/T2.
2/ For an extensive discussion of the relation between the real exchange rate, the consumption rate of interest and the current account cf Martin and Selowsky (1983) and Dornbusch (1983) .
favorable income effects of tariff induced terms of trade changes (the gains of which will be spread out over both periods) and because they lead to an increase in the consumption rate of interest favorably affecting private savings. It should be stressed that the CA improvement stems from the fact that the tariff is temporary.
The fourth term, (D), may reverse this result, since X1 < 0.
The intuition is clear: higher tariffs cause first period unemployment and hence low first period income in the presence of real consumption wage indexation.
Standard income smoothing arguments explain that this has a negative impact on the first period current account.
An expression similar to (14) can be derived for future temporary tariff increases (df2 > 0). It is straightforward to show that with the assumptions made so far, future tariff increases will lead to a period 1 current account deficit. The story is similar: income effects via favorable terms of trade changes come in the future but are partially spent today, and the real consumption rate of interest falls.
Taking the two results together to analyze a permanent increase in tariffs df1 = df2
= df, we get that in the absence of real wage indexation a permanent tariff leaves the current account unaffected:
Under the symmetry assumptions made the discount factor will not change:
while income effects are the same in both periods. Accordingly a permanent tariff increase has no impact on the current account, independent of the type of elasticity conditions that are usually claimed to be sufficient to guarantee such an improvement (c.f. Dornbusch (1980) ):
The reason for this is quite straightforward: a tariff changes relative prices within the period in which it is levied, but a permanent tariff does that both today and tomorrow, leaving the relative price of consumption today in terms of consumption tomorrow (one plus the consumption rate of interest) unaffected. Accordingly, savings will not change, which explains the absence of a current account impact. The extension to endogenous investment is discussed in Section 4.
All these results are considerably modified however if real wage resistance to the tariff induced increase in the cost of living is introduced. Ignoring second round effects of real wage changes on the terms of trade and via that on the consumption rate of interest and thus on saving For a temporary tariff there is the offsetting effect of the direct impact of the first period tariff on the real discount factor; but we can still show that even if a CA surplus results it will be smaller than without real wage indexat ion:
3. Some Qualifications
We will briefly discuss the consequences of relaxing the complete specialization assumption and of introducing investment.
Incomplete specialization plays no role in the full employment --NWI case: all the conclusions will carry through although one expects smaller relative price movements since these now also trigger resource shifts. The case with wage indexation, WI, needs more qualifications. If both capital and labour are mobile between sectors, Stolper-Samuelson tells us that market clearing wages will fall or rise in terms of both goods (and therefore in terms of the consumption price index depending on whether the tariff is levied on the capital or labour intensive good. Real wage indexation will lead to results similar to those obtained in Section 3 if the tariff is levied on the capital intensive good since the indexation scheme will prevent the downward adjustment in real wages necessary to maintain full employment.
The conditions under which unemployment will arise in response to tariffs in a Ricardo-Viner sector-specific capital, mobile labor model with real wage indexation are more complicated and will also involve consumption shares. Consider the small country case (p1= 0). We can use the results in Mussa (1974b) to derive the condition under which a full employment equilibrium would be characterized by a lower real consumpion wage after the imposition of an import tariff:
-'D1 collect all the second round effects working in the opposite direction. Once again going to the small country case allows unambiguous results:
or permanent tariffs will improve the CA contrary to the no-investment case, but will do so because investment declines.
Incomplete specialization will make this result conditional on the tariff being levied on the labor intensive good.
Wage Subsidies Financed by Tariff Revenues
At the root of the problems discussed in Section 3 is the fact that real wage indexatjon leads to an increase in the real domestic-product wage after an increase in tariffs. A natural response is to use the tariff revenues to drive a wedge between real product wages and real consumption wages via wage subsidies: this would allow the real consumption wage to remain constant without an increase in the real product wage.
In what follows we take a slightly different approach: part of the tariff revenues is used to keep the utility of wage earners constant. 1/ A related analysis can be found in Dixit and Norman (1980) ; there however one of the two factors of production receives all tariff revenues, while we give wage earners only as much as is needed to keep their utility constant.
Consider a simplified one period version of the model of Section 2.
We now have to distinguish the incomes accruing to the two factors of production in the home economy. Denote the expenditure function of domestic wage earners as e and of capitalists as .
Similarly u and i
represent utility of wage earners and capitalists respectively. Accordingly, tariff revenues equal T = t(ef + ef). A fraction X of T is handed out to wage earners. A is determined endogenously in such a way that u will not be affected by the change in tariffs.
The budget constraint of workers is:
e(p,f,u) = w + Xt(ef+ ef).
1/ This approach was suggested by Avinash Dixit.
Similarly, capitalists face the constraint
The foreign budget constraint is * * * 
e du = (-e )dp + (
So an increase in tariffs is good because you get reimbursed for outlays you did not make (Af for wage earners and (l-A)ef for capitalists) and bad because you are only incompletely reimbursed for costs you do incur (-(l-A)ef for wage earners and -A for capitalists). If 1/ Keep in mind we are once again in the complete specialization framework.
1/ In deriving 24d we also used homogeneity properties of e and e In the case of labour market clearing real wages a permanent increase in tariffs is shown to leave the current account unaffected under reasonable symmetry assumptions, since the income effects caused by tariffs induced terms of trade changes are the same (per unit of time) in both periods and the consumption rate of interest does not change. A temporary tariff increase "today" however leads to a stronger term of trade induced income effect today than tomorrow; moreover, the current period apreciation caused by a temporary tariff is larger than the second period terms of trade improvement, leading to an increase in the consumption rate of interest. Both factors lead to a CA improvement as a consequence of temporary first period tariffs.
Real wage indexation is shown to potentially modify these results.
In the Mundell-Fleining context of complete specialization, tariffs are shown to increase the domestic real product wage if wages are indexed on the CPI.
This in turn implies that an increase in tariffs, if unanticipated at the time first period wage contracts were concluded, will inevitably lead to unemployment via the resulting upward pressure on the real domestic product wage. This holds for both temporary and permanent increases in tariffs. As a consequence first period output and therefore income declines, contributing a negative element to the current account response. In the limiting case of an infinite foreign demand elasticity (small country assumption) this negative element is shown to dominate: in that case a permanent increase in tariffs will lead to more unemployment, a fall in first period real output and a current account deficit.
Temporary first period increases in tariffs will under real wage indexation also lead to more unemployment and less first period real output, but the increase in the real consumption rate of interest they also cause may (or may not) offset the negative effect on the current account of the fall in first period income associated with the increase in unemployment. Even if the CA response is positive it will always be less than the corresponding CA response to temporary tariffs without real wage indexation. Endogenizing the World Interest Rate Endogenizing the world interest rate r (or, equivalently, the world discount factor 6) is straightforward. We will provide only a sketch of the results one should expect; a full discussion of the interaction between commercial policy and world interest rates can be found in van Wijnbergen (1986) .
If current and future goods are imperfect substitutes, we need to incorporate one of the two commodity market clearing conditions for foreign goods. We choose the one for current (as opposed to future) foreign goods: A straightforward result follows from (15a). If a permanent tariff changes p1 as much as it changes p2, it will leave both CA1 and CA1 unaffected for given world interest rates. But then, if B.2 held before the change in commercial policy, it will also hold after the change in commercial policy. Hence, in that case, the world interest rate will be unaffected.
A second simple result emerges in the case where current domestic and foreign goods are close substitutes, so that the tariff change does not affect the terms of trade very much. Equation (18) shows an ex ante CA decline for 1/ Private budget constraints at home an abroad guarantee that, if B.2 holds, the world CA will also equal zero in period two.
given world interest rates in that case; to restore equilibrium in world capital markets (so that B.2 holds again), the world interest rate needs to rise. Unbalanced initial CA (and offsetting CA*) positions will add income effects in a predictable manner.
